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Abstract
Groundwater resources are critically important for irrigated agriculture in Tunisia. However, excessive 
irrigation extractions where groundwater is slowly renewed are causing a widespread depletion of the 
aquifer systems, with the impacts of climate change expected to further exacerbate this problem. These 
circumstances call for the development of methodologies and analyses that can support the design of 
sustainable groundwater management policies. This paper presents a hydro-economic mathematical 
programming model that is used to evaluate the effects of different policy measures for reducing aquifer 
depletion in the Cap-Bon region of Tunisia. Three policies have been evaluated: a quota defining the 
maximum quantity of groundwater extractions, environmental taxation, and supply expansion with 
subsidized desalinated seawater. Overall, results highlight the economic and social tradeoffs among 
these different policy choices and the challenges facing the implementation of sustainable groundwater 
management in Tunisia. More specifically, results show the advantages of using subsidized desalinated 
seawater compared to the other two policy alternatives in terms of the value of agricultural production, 
farmers’ profits, and employment, despite of its sizeable budgetary burden.
Keywords: Climate change, Groundwater depletion, Mathematical programming, Water policy measures, 
Tunisia.
1. Introduction
Irrigated agriculture plays an important role 
in securing global food production, and sustain-
ing locally rural livelihoods and ecosystems. It 
is estimated that 17% of agricultural lands are 
irrigated, yet they account for 40% of the global 
food production (Abdullah, 2006). At the same 
time, irrigation is the main user of water resourc-
es worldwide, and especially in arid and semi-
arid regions (Shiklomanov, 2000). On the other 
hand, groundwater represents the world’s largest 
freshwater resource and is critically important for 
irrigated agriculture (Koundouri, 2004). Howev-
er, depletion is widespread in large groundwater 
systems in both semi-arid and humid regions of 
the world (Konikow, 2011). Excessive extrac-
tion for irrigation where groundwater is slowly 
renewed is the main cause of the depletion, and 
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climate change has the potential to exacerbate 
the problem in some regions (Wada et al. 2012).
Tunisia is one of the countries in the world 
least well-endowed with water resources. 
These resources are scarce and their quality 
is degraded. Therefore, Tunisia has become a 
water stressed country in terms of per capita 
renewable water resources, with only 400 m3 
per capita, which is well below the global av-
erage of 1000 m3 per capita (WB, 2014). Water 
problems in Tunisia are linked to the country’s 
shrinking water supply, and to the exceeding-
ly high and growing water demand, mainly in 
the agricultural sector (that already uses 85% 
of total water withdrawals) (ITES, 2014). With 
most available surface waters already polluted, 
groundwater resources are now being heav-
ily overexploited. The challenges posed by 
non-sustainable groundwater use are most no-
table in Tunisia, with extractions significantly 
exceeding the natural recharge. For instance, 
the total number of aquifers in Tunisia is about 
273, of which 71 are overexploited at an av-
erage rate of 146% (i.e. 46% higher than their 
natural recharging rate), with total groundwa-
ter depletion amounting to about 650 Mm3 per 
year (ITES, 2014; TICET, 2009). 
Several policy measures have been progres-
sively introduced and implemented to address 
groundwater depletion in Tunisia during recent 
decades (Frija et al., 2015). This includes the 
requirement for an authorization for the pump-
ing of groundwater resources; the classification 
of some overused aquifers as “exclusion are-
as”, where the exploitation of groundwater has 
to be strictly authorized by government admin-
istrations; and the classification of other more 
critical aquifers as “prohibited areas”, where 
all types of new wells are strictly prohibited 
and any infraction is punished by law. Despite 
these efforts, groundwater policies in Tunisia 
are considered to be insufficient (Faysse et al., 
2011). For instance, the use of economic instru-
ments to deal with groundwater depletion re-
mains limited, with the main economic instru-
ment used is related to the National Program for 
Water Savings, which offers farmers subsidies 
for investing in irrigation-saving technologies 
(Bachta and Elloumi, 2005). 
The majority of studies conducted in Tunisia 
about groundwater management policies are 
thus far descriptive (Faysse et al., 2011, Frija et 
al., 2015, Ghazouani and Mekki 2016; Elloumi 
2016), despite the valuable recommendations 
provided to address groundwater depletion. 
Mahdi and Sghaier (2017) used the theory of 
information asymmetry to investigate the in-
centive regulation for public irrigation water 
services managed by irrigation agencies in the 
south of Tunisia, which could be considered as 
the only study tried to introduce quantitative 
approach into groundwater management. Our 
paper aims to provide a quantitative compar-
ative analysis of the effectiveness of different 
policy measures (water use quota, environmen-
tal tax, and supply expansion with subsidized 
desalinated seawater) to control groundwater 
extractions under current and future climate 
conditions in Tunisia, using a hydro-economic 
mathematical programming model. To the best 
of our knowledge, there are no studies in the 
literature that used a hydro-economic modeling 
approach to evaluate groundwater policies in a 
context of climate change in Tunisia.
Our analysis focuses on an intensive irrigat-
ed area in Northeastern Tunisia, the Cap-Bon 
region. This region is one of the most produc-
tive agricultural areas in Tunisia, produces 
most of country’s exported crops, and provides 
considerable employment opportunities. In-
tensive irrigation activities in this region have 
caused a substantial increase of groundwater 
extractions, and consequently the depletion 
of groundwater resources along with the deg-
radation of their quality. The sustainability of 
groundwater-based irrigation in the Cap-Bon 
region has become a real challenge for decision 
makers (Frija et al., 2015, Elloumi, 2016).
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. First, a literature review on the avail-
able policy measures to control groundwater 
extractions is conducted in Section 2. Section 
3 describes the study area and data sources, 
followed by the explanation of the modeling 
framework and scenarios of groundwater man-
agement in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the 
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes with the 
summary and policy implications. 
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2. Literature review: policy measures to con-
trol groundwater extractions
This section reviews a number of studies in 
the literature that investigated the use of policy 
measures to regulate groundwater extractions 
and reduce aquifer depletion. A large bundle of 
policy measures are proposed in the literature 
for managing groundwater resources (Koun-
douri, 2004). The most commonly used meas-
ures are based on restricting water pumping 
by establishing quotas that define a maximum 
quantity of water extraction or a minimum water 
table level. The advantage of water quotas is that 
they allow equity issues to be taken into consid-
eration and promote transparent reallocation of 
water (Johansson et al., 2002; Blanco-Gutiérrez 
et al., 2010). However, some studies in the lit-
erature indicate that water quotas are less effi-
cient compared to other measures, too inflexible 
to adapt to changing climate and market condi-
tions, and associated with high implementation 
costs (Zekri, 2008; Molle, 2009; Esteban and 
Dinar, 2013). An alternative to water quotas is 
the buyback of pumping permits by the public 
authorities. This measure has the advantage of 
permanently reducing extractions and does not 
harm farmers’ income, as they are compensated, 
but it has both a high public budgetary cost and 
significant impacts on the rural economy (Car-
mona et al., 2011).
Public policies that provide different type of 
subsidies to reduce groundwater extractions, 
such as subsidies for investments in improved 
irrigation technology or the use of alternative 
water sources, are often viewed as effective and 
politically-feasible control measures. Perry and 
Hellegers (2012) show that, contrary to wide-
spread expectations, subsidized improved irriga-
tion technology in Yemen triggered the expan-
sion of irrigated areas and the shift towards more 
profitable and water-intensive crops, which in-
creased groundwater extractions. Similar results 
on the effects of subsidized improved irrigation 
technology on groundwater extractions are found 
in the United States (Pfeiffer and Lin, 2014). 
Martínez-Granados and Calatrava (2014) ana-
lyze the opportunity to reduce aquifer depletion 
in Southeast Spain with the use of desalinated 
seawater and find that desalinated water may not 
be effective to reduce groundwater extractions 
if farmers have to bear the full desalination cost 
and no subsidy is provided. Zekri et al. (2014) 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of managed aqui-
fer recharge using treated wastewater in Oman, 
which seems to be an appealing measure from an 
economic perspective if groundwater is used for 
drinking purposes, but not for irrigation because 
of the high cost of wastewater treatment.
Tax instruments that penalize the use of 
groundwater or the decrease in the water table 
level are also policy measures commonly ana-
lyzed in the literature for their water-saving 
potential and their reputation as appropriate 
cost-recovery mechanisms (Sorensen and Her-
bertsson, 1998). In most countries around the 
world, farmers using groundwater usually pay 
for the investment and operating costs of water 
pumping but they do not pay any additional fee 
(Berbel et al., 2007). Thus, the financial costs of 
groundwater pumping are fully recovered, but 
resource and environmental costs are usually 
not included, causing the depletion of aquifers 
(Garrido and Calatrava, 2010). From a theoreti-
cal point of view, a tax instrument is an effective 
policy measure to control the level of groundwa-
ter extractions (Esteban and Dinar, 2013). How-
ever, many empirical applications conclude that 
irrigation water demand is very inelastic in the 
short term, at least for low water prices or re-
duced water availability (Wheeler et al., 2008), 
and that the taxation of groundwater extractions 
can have a significant impact not only on farm-
ers, but also on the whole agricultural sector and 
the rural economy (Scardigno et al., 2014). 
The last two decades witnessed the upsurge 
of new water management measures based on 
the involvement of stakeholders, including 
market-based instruments and voluntary agree-
ments. Market-based instruments, such as water 
tradable permits, in which users are assigned a 
quantity of water (permits) and they have the 
option to sell them to or to buy from other users 
(private market rules) are efficient mechanisms 
because the market establishes the optimal pric-
es and quantities (Easter et al., 1999). However, 
one challenge facing the implementation of such 
measures is the necessity of having well-func-
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tioning water institutions to manage the rights 
and setup the rules (Skurray and Pannell, 2012). 
On the other hand, the voluntary agreements 
which users undertake by themselves to reduce 
the extractions and protect the resource are effi-
cient instruments, but usually require the crea-
tion of incentives for farmers to collaborate and 
monitoring costs to prevent cheating (Madani 
and Dinar, 2012; Esteban and Albiac, 2012).
3. Study area and data sources
The Cap-Bon region is located in Northeast-
ern Tunisia (Figure 1). Its climate is semiarid 
with an average annual precipitation of 420 mm 
(INM, 2005). Water used in the region origi-
nates from four sources: surface water in local 
dams, groundwater, treated wastewater, and 
surface water transfer coming from the Med-
jerda River in Northern Tunisia. Only surface 
water and groundwater resources are used for 
irrigation. However, the reduction of surface 
water allocation to irrigated agriculture in order 
to meet the growing demand of competing uses 
is increasing irrigation pressures on groundwa-
ter resources. 
At present, irrigation in the Cap-Bon region 
extends over 26,000 ha, which represents 2.6% 
of the total agricultural area in Tunisia. It con-
tributes with about 35% to the country’s agri-
cultural production (ITES, 2014). Irrigation in 
the Cap-Bon region uses about 74 Mm3 of wa-
ter, of which 54 Mm3 are groundwater resourc-
es from the East Coast aquifer, 8.5 Mm3 are sur-
face water resources from local dams, and 11.5 
Mm3 are surface water resources coming from 
the Medjerda water transfer project (DGGREE, 
2012).
For the purpose of the present paper, our 
analysis focuses on the coastal irrigated area 
(highlighted in red with dashed lines in Figure 
1), which covers 15% (or 3,930 ha) of the to-
tal irrigated area in the Cap-Bon region, which 
well represents the cropping pattern and farm-
ing practices in the whole region. Data used in 
this study has been collected from several pri-
mary and secondary data sources. A survey was 
conducted during 2011 and 2012 with 150 farm-
ers spread across the study area. The data set 
in table 1 includes revenues and costs of crops, 
crop area, labor use, yields, water use, and crop 
prices. The data set also includes information on 
Figure 1 - Map of the Cap-Bon region.
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the water prices in the study area, which amount 
to 0.07 dt/m3 for surface water diversion and 0.3 
dt/m3 for groundwater pumping. These data are 
obtained from a series of surveys within the 
framework of the project “Virtual water and 
food security in Tunisia, 2012-2015” (Benalaya 
et al., 2015).
The selected irrigated area uses water from 
two sources: surface water that amounts to 11.2 
Mm3 per year (60% of total water use) origi-
nating from both the Medjerda water transfer 
project and local dams, and groundwater ex-
tractions from the East Coast aquifer amount-
ing to 7.4 Mm3 per year (40% of total water 
use). Groundwater extractions are well above 
the natural recharge of the aquifer, estimated 
to be around 0.24 Mm3 per year. The intensive 
pumping for irrigated agriculture in this area 
has caused considerable water table level draw-
down (about 5 m below the sea level), and sea-
water intrusion (with salinity concentration of 
water between 5 and 8 g/l) (Chebil et al., 2014).
4. Methodology and scenarios
4.1.  Modeling framework
The analysis of the policy measures to re-
duce aquifer depletion is conducted using a 
hydro-economic mathematical programming 
model. This model follows a similar approach 
used by Kahil et al. (2015a, 2015b and 2016a), 
which integrates hydrologic, agronomic and 
economic components into a unified modeling 
framework for a comprehensive policy analysis. 
This type of models simulates land and water 
allocation among crops and computes several 
economic indicators (value of agricultural pro-
duction, production costs, farmers’ profits, pub-
lic expenditures and collections, cultivated area, 
and agricultural employment). The objective of 
our model is to maximize farmers’ profits in the 
study area, subject to various technical and re-
source constraints. A Leontief production func-
tion technology is assumed with fixed input and 
output prices, where farmers are price takers. 
Table 1 - Crop area, water use and economic data in the study area.
Crops
Land in 
production 
(ha)
Water 
use 
(m3/ha)
Labor 
use 
(day/ha)
Yield 
(T/ha)
Crop
Price 
(dt/T)
Revenue 
(dt/ha) 
Cost of 
production 
(dt/ha) 
Gross 
margin 
(dt/ha) 
Tomato 865 4,500 109 80 127 10,160 5,079 4,766
Pepper 395 6,745 80 13 500 6,500 4,253 1,775
Strawberry 564 7,841 57 30 1,750 52,500 28,551 23,401
Other summer 
vegetables 
(OVS)
56 4,000 52 30 400 12,000 8,330 3,390
Cabbage 88 3,802 103 70 250 17,500 5,022 12,212
Other winter 
vegetables 
(OVW)
1,166 3,500 58 45,000 0.3 13,500 3,350 9,905
Grenade 144 2,500 23 11 650 7,150 1,297 5,678
Grapes 22 6,000 76 11 1,350 14,850 1,622 12,808
Citrus 72 8,892 27 40 500 20,000 7,254 12,124
Other fruit 
trees (OFT) 101 4,500 121 20 650 13,000 4,285 8,400
Fodder 457 3,000 21 350 8 2,800 1,361 1,229
Total 3,930
Source: Benalaya et al. (2015). Note: One Tunisian Dinar (dt) is equivalent to 0.54 US Dollars in 2014.
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The mathematical formulation of the model is 
as follows:
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where equation (1) is the objective function of 
farmers’ profits from irrigation activities, which 
is defined by the difference between crop reve-
nues and production costs (including water and 
non-water costs). This objective function is max-
imized subject to land use constraint (equation 
2), water availability constraint (equation 3), and 
labor constraint (equation 4). Equation (5) is the 
non-negativity constraint. The parameters of the 
model are: Pi = price of crop i; Yi = yield of crop i; 
P
sw
 = price of surface water diversion; P
gw
 = cost 
of groundwater pumping; and Prodcostsi = pro-
duction costs other than water costs of crop i. 
Landavail is land available for crop cultivation, 
Wateravail is the amount of surface and ground 
waters available for irrigation, and Laboravail is 
labor availability in the region. The variables of 
the model are: Xi = area of each crop i; SW = sur-
face water diversion; and GW = groundwater 
extractions. The solution of the model provides 
information on the optimal cropping pattern and 
associated inputs use including water and labor 
use, as well as the economic benefits and costs 
associated with the agricultural production. 
The use of mathematical programming mod-
els to analyze agricultural production at region-
al level faces the problem of aggregation and 
overspecialization because farms in a region 
are different in terms of resources endowment, 
technologies, and management skills. Ideally, 
a regional model should include a component 
for every individual farm, but this is unfeasi-
ble because of the complexity of such a model. 
Many approaches have been developed to solve 
this problem and to calibrate regional models to 
observed conditions such as the representative 
farm approach (Day, 1963), the convex combi-
nation approach (Önal and McCarl, 1991), and 
the positive mathematical programming (PMP) 
approach (Howitt, 1995). 
Our model is calibrated to observed crop 
area using the PMP approach. The application 
of this approach as a mean for calibration has 
significantly increased during the last two dec-
ades. The main advantages of PMP compared 
to other approaches are the exact representation 
of the base conditions, lower data requirements, 
and a smooth response of the model to continu-
ous changes in exogenous parameters when the 
model is used for analysis of policy changes. 
In this study, we follow the standard PMP ap-
proach to calibrate our model to observed crop 
area, which involves a two-step procedure for 
implementation (Fragoso and Marques, 2015). 
In the first step, the model described in equa-
tions (1) to (5) is bounded by observed crop area 
by introducing a set of calibration constraints. 
In the second step, dual values associated with 
the calibration constraints are used to calculate 
calibration parameters, which represent the mar-
ginal cost coefficients of a convex cost function, 
and are incorporated into the objective function 
(1), such that once the calibration constraints are 
removed, the modified model reproduces exact-
ly the observed crop area. 
4.2. Policy and climate scenarios 
The hydro-economic model is used to assess 
the effects of three policy measures under two 
climate scenarios. The three policy measures are 
the following: 
Policy 1: This measure aims to eliminate aqui-
fer overexploitation, by establishing a quota that 
limits the maximum quantity of groundwater 
extractions for irrigation purposes to the natural 
recharge of the aquifer.
Policy 2: This measure introduces an environ-
mental tax on groundwater extractions in order 
to reduce extractions up to the natural recharge 
of the aquifer, following the “polluter pays” prin-
ciple and reflecting the full cost of water supply 
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as well as the scarcity value of the resource. This 
measure is similar to the water pricing policy 
advocated by the European Water Framework 
Directive. 
Policy 3: This measure expands the water 
supply for irrigated agriculture. The measure 
seeks to substitute non-renewable groundwater 
resources with subsidized desalinated seawater. 
Tunisia has the advantage of having a relatively 
long coastline which gives it easy access to this 
resource. Therefore, one potential solution to ad-
dress the growing water scarcity in Tunisia is to 
invest in desalination plants.
The considered climate scenarios are the fol-
lowing:
Scenario 1 or current climate conditions: This 
scenario represents the current climate condi-
tions in the study area.
Scenario 2 or future climate change condi-
tions: This scenario reduces surface water avail-
ability by 10% and groundwater recharge by 
30% by 2030. This scenario is in line with the 
IPCC climate projections for the Mediterranean 
region (IPCC 2014).
5. Results and discussion
5.1.  Scenario 1: Current climate condition 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the outcomes of 
the different policy measures under current cli-
mate conditions. In the baseline scenario (i.e. 
observed situation), farmers’ profits amount to 
32.5 Million Tunisian Dinars (Mdt). The value 
of agricultural production is 64.3 Mdt. The pro-
duction costs other than water costs are 29 Mdt 
and water costs are 3 Mdt. Irrigated area is 3,930 
ha. Total water use is about 18 Mm3 of which 11 
Mm3 are surface water and 7 Mm3 are groundwa-
ter resources (Table 2). 
Results of Policy 1, that eliminates aquifer 
overexploitation and limits irrigation ground-
water extractions to the natural recharge of the 
aquifer, indicate a reduction of irrigated area by 
39%, with water-intensive and low-value crops 
(e.g. pepper and fodder) removed from the pro-
duction plan, and water is more efficiently used, 
allocating it to high-value crops (e.g. strawberry 
and grapes) (Figure 2). Water use is reduced by 
38%. Production costs and water costs are re-
duced by 30 and 70%, respectively. The value of 
agricultural production falls down by 22% from 
64 Mdt in the baseline scenario to 50 Mdt under 
policy 1. Farmers’ profits decrease by only 5%. 
Labor demand is reduced by 38%.
Results of Policy 2 that introduces an environ-
mental tax on groundwater extractions indicate 
that the optimal environmental tax that reduces 
extractions up to the natural recharge of the aq-
uifer is equal to 0.77 dt/m3. This policy produces 
almost the same outcomes of Policy 1 in terms 
of crop area, water use, value of agricultural pro-
duction, and labor demand. However, there is a 
Table 2 - Results of the policy measures under current climate conditions.
Baseline scenario Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3
Crop area (ha) 3,930 2,393 2,393 3,930
Total water use (Mm3) 18.6 11.4 11.4 18.6
SW use (Mm3) 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2
GW use (Mm3) 7.4 0.24 0.24 0.24
Desalinated water use (Mm3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2
Value of Agricultural production (Mdt) 64.3 49.6 49.6 64.3
Production costs (Mdt) 28.8 17.8 17.8 28.8
Water costs (Mdt) 3.0 0.9 1.0 3.0
Farmers’ profits (Mdt) 32.5 30.9 30.7 32.5
Public collection (Mdt) 0.8 0.8 1.0 -5.2
Labor use (days) 266,383 164,874 164,874 266,383
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slight decrease of farmers’ profits and increase 
of water costs. In addition, public collection of 
water fees rise by 24% compared to both the 
baseline scenario and Policy 1.
Results of Policy 3 that expands the supply of 
water with subsidized desalinated seawater in-
dicate that for a full elimination of groundwa-
ter depletion in the area, the government should 
provide a subsidy of 0.83 dt/m3 (75% of the cost 
of seawater desalination equal to 1.15 dt/m3). 
Desalinated seawater use amounts to 7.2 Mm3. 
The outcomes of Policy 3 are similar to those 
of the baseline scenario in terms of crop area, 
total water use, value of agricultural production, 
production costs, water costs, famers’ profits, 
and labor demand. However, public collection is 
considerably reduced because of the huge costs 
of desalination. Under Policy 3, the government 
spends 5.2 Mdt. 
5.2.  Scenario 2: Future climate condition
Results of the different policy measures for 
this climate scenario are shown in Table 3 and 
Figure 3. Results of Policy 1 that eliminates 
aquifer overexploitation and limits irrigation 
groundwater extractions to the natural recharge 
of the aquifer show a reduction of crop area by 
43%, with pepper and fodder removed from the 
production plan (Figure 3). Water use decreases 
by 41%. Production costs and famers’ profits are 
reduced by 46 and 8%, respectively. The value of 
agricultural production falls down by 28% from 
63 Mdt in the baseline scenario to 45 Mdt under 
policy 1. Labor demand is reduced by 44%.
Results of Policy 2 that introduces an envi-
ronmental tax on groundwater extractions, in-
dicate that the optimal environmental tax that 
reduces extractions up to the natural recharge 
of the aquifer is equal to 1.04 dt/m3, 35% high-
er than under the current climate condition (or 
scenario 1). This policy produces almost the 
same outcomes of Policy 1 in terms of crop 
area, water use, value of agricultural produc-
tion, and labor demand. However, there is a 
slight decrease of farmers’ profits and increase 
of water costs. In addition, the public collection 
of water fees rises by 26% compared to base-
line scenario and Policy 1.
Results of Policy 3 that expands the supply 
of water with subsidized desalinated seawater 
indicate that for a full elimination of ground-
water depletion in the area, the government 
should provide a subsidy of 0.83 dt/m3 (the same 
Figure 2 - Land use decision for each policy measure under current climate condition (ha).
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Table 3 - Results of the policy measures under future climate condition.
Baseline scenario Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3
Crop area (ha) 3,772 2,134 2,134 3,772
Total water use (Mm3) 17.5 10.2 10.2 17.5
SW use (Mm3) 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
GW use (Mm3) 7.4 0.17 0.17 0.17
Desalinated water use (Mm3) 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3
Value of Agricultural production (Mdt) 63.4 45.5 45.5 63.4
Production costs (Mdt) 28.2 15.2 15.2 28.2
Water costs (Mdt) 2.9 0.8 0.9 2.9
Farmers’ profits (Mdt) 32.2 29.6 29.4 32.2
Public collection (Mdt) 0.7 0.7 0.9 -5.3
Labor use (days) 253,836 142,078 142,078 253,836
amount as under the current climate condition). 
Desalinated water use amounts to 7.2 Mm3. 
The outcomes of Policy 3 are similar to those 
of the baseline scenario in terms of crop area, 
total water use, value of agricultural production, 
production costs, water costs, farmers’ profits, 
and labor demand. However, public collection is 
considerably reduced because of the huge costs 
of desalination. Under Policy 3, the government 
spends 5.3 Mdt. 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Groundwater depletion is a major environ-
mental issue in Tunisia. Intensive groundwa-
ter-based irrigation activities have increased 
significantly the pressures on aquifers leading to 
considerable groundwater table level drawdown, 
and water and soil quality degradation. Climate 
change impacts are expected to reduce water 
availability and increase the frequency and in-
tensity of extreme events in Tunisia. Under 
Figure 3 - Land use decision for each policy measure under future climate condition (ha).
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these circumstances, water authorities in Tunisia 
are considering policies to reduce groundwater 
depletion without damaging the welfare of ir-
rigation activities under climate change condi-
tions. The choice of these policies requires an 
evaluation of their economic, environmental and 
social effects. This paper aims to contribute to 
the ongoing policy discussion about the poten-
tial policy interventions to reduce groundwater 
depletion in Tunisia. The paper presents the de-
velopment of a hydro-economic mathematical 
programming model and evaluates the effects of 
various policy measures to reduce groundwater 
depletion under current and future climate con-
ditions. The selected policy measure alternatives 
are a quota limiting groundwater extractions, an 
environmental tax on groundwater extractions, 
and the substitution of overexploited groundwa-
ter for desalinated seawater resources. 
Results of this study indicate that establish-
ing a quota limiting groundwater extractions, 
in absence of alternative substituting resources, 
will have large negative impacts on agricultur-
al production under both climate scenarios, by 
reducing irrigated area and the value of agri-
cultural production. In addition, employment 
is significantly reduced under this policy meas-
ure. These results confirm previous findings in 
the literature indicating that water quota, which 
is the mainstream policy instrument to control 
groundwater extractions in Tunisia, might not be 
very effective to address groundwater manage-
ment issues and would likely be met by opposi-
tion from farmers and rural community leading 
to policy failure (Giannoccaro et al., 2010). An 
environmental tax on groundwater extractions 
yields similar outcomes to those of the water use 
quota. Its only advantage is that it generates tax 
revenues, but its implementation would be un-
feasible from a political point of view (Kahil et 
al., 2016b). In contrast, the substitution of over-
exploited groundwater for desalinated seawater 
resources protects the agricultural production, 
farmers’ profits, and employment, although the 
costs for the government are disproportionate 
compared to the other two policy alternatives. 
This policy measure could further gain ground 
in the future given the projected decreases in the 
costs of seawater desalination and the expected 
climate change impacts on conventional water 
resources (Ghaffour et al., 2013; Martínez-Gra-
nados and Calatrava, 2014). 
The comparison between the policy and climate 
scenarios presented in this study shows the eco-
nomic and social tradeoffs among the different 
policy choices and the challenges that could face 
the implementation of sustainable groundwater 
management in Tunisia. The complete restriction 
of non-renewable groundwater pumping is a chal-
lenging and potentially conflictive measure that 
would likely have a large political cost. Policy-
makers need to take into account that the success 
of any water policy intervention largely depends 
on the cooperation of the affected users that, in 
this case, would be more prone to accepting the 
option of substituting overexploited groundwater 
for subsidized desalinated seawater. Experiences 
in other regions around the world suggest that it is 
unlikely that groundwater pumping could be re-
duced without providing incentives for farmers, 
such as compensations and subsidies (Madani 
and Dinar, 2012; Esteban and Albiac, 2012). 
As a final remark, the hydro-economic mod-
el developed in this study could be improved in 
future work by including the dynamic aspects 
of groundwater resources, water quality issues, 
and environmental damages to groundwater-de-
pendent ecosystems. Additional policy measures 
could be also evaluated including improved ir-
rigation efficiency, reuse of recycled wastewa-
ter for irrigation, artificial aquifer recharge, and 
groundwater trade. 
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